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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment
of the mission.
iii

Shuttle Mission STS-51 was launched at 7:45 a.m. local 9/12/93
1
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLON PHOTOGRAPH

1.0 Summary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 16 July 1993. The detailed walkdown of Launch
Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements
OV-103 Discovery (17th flight), ET-59 (LWT 52), and BI-060
SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 17 July 1993. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IPR's were taken.
The launch was scrubbed at T-20 minutes (and holding) when
channel BET vent arm system and SRB holddown post pyrotechnic
initiator controllers armed without being commanded due to a
HIM card failure. A post drain inspection of the vehicle
revealed no significant anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a second time on 24 July 1993. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations- There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IPR's were taken.
The launch was scrubbed at T-19 seconds when the RH SRB #2 HPU
(tilt) turbine speed dropped below the specification lower
limit. A post drain inspection of the vehicle revealed damaged
foam on the inboard side of the L02 feedline adjacent to the
XT-1377 support bracket. The damaged area was repaired.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a third time on ii August 1993.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
criteria violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside
of the established data base and no IPR's were taken.
The launch was aborted at T-3 seconds due to a problem with an
SSME #2 fuel flow sensor. A post drain inspection of the
vehicle revealed no significant anomalies as a result of the
SSME shutdown and use of FIREX water-
Post abort film/video review showed FIREX water did not reach
the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical and water coverage to the ET/ORB LO2
umbilical was inconsistent. A plan was created to increase the
available water pressure by terminating the water flow on the
FSS and MLP Side I, which would not be needed for a main engine
abort. A configuration change is being evaluated to move some
FIREX nozzles to the top of the hydrogen dispersal system
decreasing the distance from the water source to the ET/ORB
umbilicals by 15 feet.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a fourth time on II September 1993.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
criteria violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside
of the established data base and no IPR's were taken.
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Vapors (visible puffs of cold purge gas) simultaneously exited
the External Tank intertank aero vents prior to SSME ignition.
These vapors are routinely observed from the start of cryo load
through terminal countdown. The visibility of the vapors is a
function of ambient temperature, relative humidity, dew point,
local winds conditions, lighting conditions (sunlight or Xenon
light), and intertank gas temperature.
After the 7:45 a.m. launch on 12 September 1993, a debris
inspection of Pad 39B was performed. No flight hardware or TPS
materials were found. EPON shim material on the south holddown
posts was intact. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. No frangible
nut/ordnance fragments were found. Damage to the facility
overall was minimal.
A total of 132 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No
stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. HDP #4
EPON sidewall shim material came loose during SRB lift off and
fell into the SRB exhaust hole. All T-0 umbilicals operated
properly.
On-orbit flight crew handheld photography revealed no major
anomalies of the External Tank that would have been a safety of
flight concern. One 8-inch divot was visible in the LH2 tank
acreage just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
between the bipods. One 8-inch divot occurred in the LH2 tank-
to-intertank flange closeout adjacent to the outboard side of
the -Y bipod spindle housing closeout. A divot, 10-12 inches in
diameter, was present in the -Y (LH) longeron closeout.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 88 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. All eight DCS plungers were seated.
Hypalon paint was extensively blistered and/or missing from
numerous areas of Booster Trowellable Ablator on the aft skirt
(IFA STS-51-B-2) . The Hypalon paint is used as a topcoat to
prevent moisture intrusion prior to launch, but is not required
for thermal protection during flight. The IFA was closed based
on the rationale that blistering and/or loss of Hypalon in
flight will not cause significant Orbiter tile damage due to
the light mass/density of the topcoat. Practical application
history has shown that blistering and loss of Hypalon occurs
most frequently when multiple coats of the paint were applied
during preflight processing. A change to the application proce-
dure may specify only one, thin coat of Hypalon.
A post landing inspection of 0V-103 was conducted after the
landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 154 hits,
of which 18 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The
Orbiter lower surface had a total of I00 hits, of which 18 had
a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these
3
numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of
similar configuration, the total number of debris hits was
slightly greater than average while the number of hits one inch
or larger was less than average. ET/Orbiter separation devices
functioned properly.
Deployment of the ACTS/TOS payload and associated TOS Super*Zip
Anomaly caused debris induced damage to the LH OMSpod leading
edge, base of the vertical stabilizer, and payload bay areas
aft of bay #ii. Video review of the satellite deployment
revealed at least 16 pieces of debris, most likely detached
frangible doublers from the outer perimeter of the Super_ZiP
separation system, exiting the payload bay. A review of on-
orbit imagery showed 6 damage sites on the vertical stabilizer
base leading edge tiles. The LH OMS pod leading edge sustained
a total of 18 tile damage sites. Seven hits were greater than
one inch in length with depths ranging from 0.75 to 1.00 inch-
Post landing inspection of the payload bay revealed three
penetrations in bay #12 cable tray covers, one penetration
through the aft bulkhead near APU #3, scrapes on the bay #12
sill longeron, cuts/tears in thirteen TPS insulation blankets,
and silicone/lead residues on fifteen aft bulkhead blankets. A
13-inch long segment of the frangible doubler was wedged
between the port sill and the aft bulkhead.
During the ACTS/TOS deployment, the primary and secondary
separation detonation cords in the airborne support equipment
Super_Zip device fired simultaneously- This caused the ordnance
containment tube to rupture and release debris into the orbiter
payload bay. Only the primary detonation cord should have fired
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) exhaust at the base of the vertical
stabilizer, left side, appeared to be 2 - 3 feet in height and
more noticeable than previous night landings. Infrared imagery
during approach/rollout, cockpit instrumentation, and telemetry
indicated the APU exhaust plume was typical and similar to APU
operation for launch. APU #3 exhaust plume on the right side of
the vertical stabilizer was present but barely visible.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter lower surface tile samples
from the Orbiter TPS, and paints/primers from various sources.
A noteworthy finding was a trace of lead metallic in one of the
forward OMS pod samples. The lead could have originated from
the TOS Super_ZiP anomaly. These residual sampling data do not
indicate a single source of damaging debris as all of the
materials have been documented previously in post-landing
sample reports. The residual sample data also showed no debris
trends when compared to previous mi_ssion data.
A total of 9 Post Launch Anomalies, including one In-Flight
Anomaly, were observed during the STS-51 mission assessment.
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2 . 0 PRE-I_AUNCH BRIEFING
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for
launch activities was conducted on I0 September 1993 at 0830
hours with the following key personnel present:
G. Katnik
B. Davis
P. Rosado
R. Speece
B. Bowen
K. Tenbusch
J. Rivera
A. Oliu
J. Cawby
J- Blue
J. Kercsmar
M. Wollam
M. Dean
W. Richards
J. Church
Z. Byrns
J. Stone
W. Atkinson
R. Kretz
S. Otto
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
NASA - KSC
RI - DNY
RI - LSS
MTI - LSS
MMMSS- LSS
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Debris, IR, Photo Analysis
Chief, ET Mechanical Systems
Lead, Thermal Protection Sys
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
Lead, ET Structures
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
Supervisor, ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
Level II Integration
Debris Assess, LVL II Integ
Vehicle Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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2-I pRE-LADI_CH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 16 July 1993 from 0925-1030 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the
primary flight elements 0V-103 Discovery (17th flight), ET-59
(LWT 52), and BI-060 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging
debris, and vehicle configuration changes.
There were no significant vehicle anomalies or debris issues.
Four each composite material samples were U-bolted to the hand
rails on the FSS 135, 175, 215, and 255 foot levels (east
side). The Debris Team evaluated each installation and found no
debris concerns.
Four items were entered in S0007, Appendix K: I) a loose bolt
in an MLP deck access plate west of the LH SRB exhaust hole;
2) loose bolts under the MLP zero level raised decks around the
SRB exhaust holes; 3) deck scale and dirt particles on the MLP
deck; and 4) K5NA/TPS trimmings in the HDP #5 haunch area.
The MLP deck and areas under the raised deck were
swept/vacuumed again prior to launch to remove small debris
items, such as sand, rust flakes, and paint chips.
3.0 SCRUB - SRB PIC FAILURE
The first launch attempt of STS-51 was scrubbed at T-20 minutes
and holding when channel B ET vent arm system and SRB HDP
pyrotechnic initiator controllers armed without being commanded
due to a HIM card failure.
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 17 July 1993 from 0340 to 0505 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
76.5 Degrees F
80.1 Percent
6.0 Knots
201 Degrees
A hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer was used to
obtain vehicle surface temperature measurements for a thermal
assessment of the vehicle.
3 -2 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact. Less than usual ice/frost
accumulations were present at the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle
interfaces. The base heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat
shield or engine mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors
originated from inside the SSME nozzles.
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. SRB case
temperatures measured by the spot radiometer ranged from 76 to
80 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation
(GEI) measured a temperature of 80 degrees F. All measured
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied
by MTI was 82 degrees F, which was within the required range of
44-86 degrees F.
3.4 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0030 to 0830 hours and the results tabulated in Figure i.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
Light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation, was observed
by the Ice Team on the L02 tank barrel. There were no TPS
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The Cyclops
radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 71 degrees F on
the ogive and 70 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE predicted
temperatures of 65 degrees F on the ogive and 60 degrees F on
the barrel.
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank
flanges. Typical ice frost accumulations and no unusual vapors
were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The Cyclops
radiometer measured an average surface temperature of 76
degrees F on the intertank.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate,
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
The Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged
64-70 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 63-68 degrees F on
the lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 54'
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 53 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Two
cracks, 6-inches long by 3/8-inch wide and 4-inches long by
i/4-inch wide, were present in the -Y vertical strut cable tray
forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface- These
cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled with ice or
frost. This condition was expected due to the elimination of
the stress relief gap at the factory. A small ice/frost spot
appeared on the aft side of both the +Y and -Y vertical strut-
to ET interface bondlines.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents was typical. Some ice/frost had formed on the bondline of
the aft pyro canister. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had
occurred during tanking and stable replenish.
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Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were covered
with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was present on
the forward bondline of the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout
indicating a thermal short. No unusual vapors or cryogenic
drips had appeared during tanking and stable replenish.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was removed from the
vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles, though there was a
premature release of the third attach point on the ET/SRB upper
strut fairing due to inadequate velcro surface area.
The summary of Ice Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented two cracks, 6-inches long by 3/8-inch
wide and 4-inches long by I/4-inch wide, in the -Y vertical
strut cable tray forward surface near the longeron closeout
interface. The cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled
with ice or frost.
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost formations on the -Z manhole
cover: I) +Y side at the plug pull location, 2) +Z side of the
cover. The ice/frost formations eventually melted.
Anomaly 003 documented an ice/frost formation on the forward
bondline of the aft pyro canister closeout.
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formation
below the -Y ET/SRB cable tray at the aft edge of the -Y
longeron closeout.
i0
3-5 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds.
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of
the umbilical carrier plate.
Visual a_d infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no
leakage.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LHZ
ET/ORB umbilical. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips appeared
during tanking and stable replenish.
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3.6 POST DRAIN VEHICLE XNSPECTION
The first launch attempt was scrubbed at T-20 minutes due to a
problem with SRB HDP and ET VAS PIC voltages. A post drain
inspection of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39B from 1400 to
1500 hours on July 17, 1993.
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. All
other areas of the nosecone were obscured by the GOX vent
hood/seal.
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose
foam or TPS damage was visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
A 3-inch diameter defect appeared on the +Y longeron BX-250
closeout adjacent to the thrust strut knuckle. The loose piece
of foam exhibited a i/4-inch offset. The divot was trimmed and
the area repaired by PDL foam injection. An MRB was required
since the repair area was greater than I0 square inches.
The 6-inch and 4-inch cracks in the -X ET/SRB vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team
Inspection) were still visible.
A 2-inch long ice/frost spot with venting vapors was present on
the aft dome +Z manhole cover BX-250 closeout.
No anomalies were observed on the Orbiter,
Boosters, or MLP deck.
Solid Rocket
No significant vehicle damage was discovered as a result of the
post drain inspection. The +Y longeron BX-250 divot was
repaired on a Problem Report (PR) . There were no constraints
for the next cryoload.
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A 3-inch diameter defect appeared in the +Y longeron BX-250
closeout adjacent to the thrust strut knuckle. The loose piece
of foam exhibited a 1/4 inch offset. The divot was trimmed and
repaired with PDL foam injection.
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The 6-inch and 4-inch cracks in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team
inspection) were still visible after the External Tank was
drained.
15
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4.0 SCRUB - RH SRB HI_U _2 FAILURE
A second pre-launch debris inspection of the SSV and MLP deck
was conducted from 0800 - 0905 on 23 July 1993. Numerous K5NA
trimmings, two of which measured 3 inches in length, lay in the
HDP #i and #2 haunch areas. Those trimmings, along with MLP
deck debris particles, were removed prior to cryoloading.
The second launch attempt of STS-51 was scrubbed at T-19
seconds when the RH SRB #2 (Tilt) HPU turbine speed dropped
below the specification lower limit.
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 24 July 1993 from 0330 to 0440 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
75.0 Degrees F
85.7 Percent
4 Knots
206 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
4.2 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. Some
ice/frost accumulated at the SSME #i heat shield-to-nozzle
interface 6:00 o'clock position. Some frost was present on the
SSME #i and #3 drain lines- The SSME #2 and #3 engine mounted
heat shields and tiles on the base heat shield were wet from
condensate. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature
gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat
shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME
nozzles.
4.3 SOLXD ROCKET BOOSTERS
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The STI
portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case tempera-
tures between 78 to 80 degrees F.. In comparison, temperatures
measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer
ranged from 76 to 80 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment
Instrumentation (GEI) measured temperatures of 79-83 degrees F.
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FIGURE2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
TIME: 0325-0440
DATE: 7-24-93
VEIl. STS-
All temperatures are
in degrees Fahrenheit.
Emissivity was set to 1.0
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FIGURE 3. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
TIME: 1"1325-N44N _.
DATE: 7-24-93
VEII, STS- 51 Scrub #2
All temperatures are
in degrees Fahrenheit.
Emissivity was set to 1.0
FI
!
8O 8O
65 64
\
I
18
rf;r;lV :_4"_0
All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 84 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
4.4 _ TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0030 to 0915 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 4.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
Light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation, was observed
by the Ice Team on the L02 tank barrel. There were no TPS
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The portable STI
measured surface temperatures that averaged 70 degrees F on the
ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison,
the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 70
degrees F on the ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 62 degrees F on the ogive and 58
degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and LO2 tank-to-intertank
flanges. Less than usual ice/frost accumulations and no unusual
vapors were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The
portable STI measured an average surface temperature of 76
degrees F on the intertank.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate,
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 69
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 64 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 67 degrees F on the upper and 65
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 53 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 62 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Two
cracks, 8-inches long by 3/8-inch wide and 4-inches long by
I/4-inch wide, were present in the -Y vertical strut cable tray
forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface. These
cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled with ice or
frost. This condition was expected due to the elimination of
the stress relief gap at the factory.
An ice/frost ball had formed on the aft edge of the XT-1270.2
pressurization line ramp. An ice/_rost formation appeared on
the aft edge of the +Y vertical strut closeout.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. Some ice/frost had accumulated on the
aft and inboard sides of the umbilical. Formation of ice/frost
on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents was
typical. Ice/frost had formed on the bondline of the aft pyro
canister closeout. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had
occurred during tanking and stable replenish.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were covered
with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the top
and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier.
Ice/frost on the aft side was typical_ Ice frost fingers had
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents.
Ice/frost was present on the LH2 feedline support bracket near
the forward outboard pyro canister and on the aft pyrotechnic
canister closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. No
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking
and stable replenish.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of nine OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented two areas of ice/frost with venting
vapors on the -Z manhole cover closeout. The ice/frost had
melted prior to the T-3 hour hold.
Anomaly 002 documented two cracks in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
forward surface BX-250 between the vertical strut cable tray
and the vertical strut attachment fitting fairing.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formation with venting vapors
on the +Z manhole cover closeout. The ice/frost had melted by
the T-3 hour hold.
Anomaly 004 documented an ice/frost accumulation below the -Y
ET/SRB cable tray at the lower edge of the longeron closeout.
Anomaly 005 documented an ice/frost accumulation at the aft
edge of the +Y ET/SRB cable tray-to-acreage interface.
Anomaly 006 documented ice/frost on the aft side of the XT-1270
pressurization line ramp.
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Anomaly 007 documented ice/frost at the LH2 feedline outboard
support bracket-to-acreage interface near the forward outboard
pyro canister.
Anomaly 008 documented an ice/frost formation on the -Y bipod
ramp outboard side at the intertank splice closeout.
Anomaly 009 documented ice/frost on the aft side of the ET/ORB
LH2 umbilical upper outboard pyro canister closeout.
4.5 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds.
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of
the umbilical carrier plate.
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the
GOX vent hood was retracted.
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Numerous KSNA trimmings, two of which measured 3 inches in
length, lay in the HDP #I and #2 haunch areas. Those trimmings,
along with MLP deck debris particles, were removed prior to
cryoloading.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2
ET/0RB umbilical. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips appeared
during tanking and stable replenish.
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4.6 POST DRAIN_ICLE INSFECTION
The second launch attempt was scrubbed at T-19 seconds due to a
problem with the RH SRB HPU #2 (Tilt) . A post drain inspection
of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39B from 1500 to 1530 hours
on July 24, 1993.
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. All
other areas of the nosecone were obscured by the GOX vent
hood/seal-
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the LO2 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose
foam or TPS damage was visible during the preliminary post
drain inspection. Subsequent hands-on inspection revealed
damaged foam (II" x 4.5" in size) on the inboard side of the
feedline adjacent to the XT-1377 support bracket. The area was
repaired with PDL foam.
Two additional areas of damaged foam were found on the LO2
feedline support bracket and on the adjacent LH2 tank barrel
CPR. The areas were evaluated and accepted by MRB to use-as-is.
The TPS defect on the +Y longeron BX-250 closeout, which was
repaired prior to the second cryoload, was intact and showed no
evidence of thermal short.
The 6-inch and 4-inch cracks in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team
Inspection) were still visible. Ice/frost was observed in the
4-inch crack, a condition which must be assessed per the
requirements in the NSTS 08303 criteria. Subsequent inspection
revealed no debonds from substrater so the condition was
acceptable for flight.
Three ice/frost spots were present on the LH2 tank aft dome +Z
manhole cover BX-250 closeout. One ice/frost spot occurred on
the -Z manhole cover BX-250 closeout bondline.
No significant anomalies were observed on the Orbiter. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intactr though the R2U and R3R
covers appeared to be wetted by vapors inside the thruster.
There were no anomalies on the Solid Rocket Boosters or MLP.
No significant vehicle damage was observed during the post
drain inspection. The LO2 feedline TPS damage was repaired on a
PR. There were no constraints for the next cryoload.
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5.0 ABORT - SSMU_ 4}2 SENSOR FA_IL_
A third pre-launch debris inspection of the SSV and MLP deck
was conducted from 0915-1015 hours on II August 1993. Numerous
bolts in MLP deck access covers near the RH SRB were loose. MLP
deck debris particles were removed prior to cryoloading.
The third launch attempt of STS-51 was aborted at T-3 seconds
due to a problem with an SSME #2 fuel flow sensor.
5.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on Ii August 1993 from 0340 to 0450 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
77.4 Degrees F
92.0 Percent
3.8 Knots
341 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 5 and 6.
5.2 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact, though the R2U, R3R, and L2L
thruster covers had been wetted by internal vapors. Less than
usual ice/frost had formed on the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle
interfaces. Some frost was present on the SSME #i and #3 drain
lines. The SSME engine mounted heat shields were wet from
condensate. Tiles on the base heat shield were dry. An infrared
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat
shield or engine mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors
originated from inside the SSME nozzles.
5.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The STI
portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case tempera-
tures between 77 to 81 degrees Fahrenheit (F) . In comparison,
temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot
radiometer ranged from 78 to 81 degrees F and the SRB Ground
Environment Instrumentation (GEI) measured temperatures of
78-82 degrees F.
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All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement- The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 85 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
5.4 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0030 to 0830 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 7.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
Light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation, was observed
by the Ice Team on the LO2 tank barrel. There were no TPS
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The portable STI
measured surface temperatures that averaged 71 degrees F on the
ogive and 67 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison,
the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 73
degrees F on the ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 65 degrees F on the ogive and 57
degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank
flanges. Typical ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors
were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable
STI measured an average surface temperature of 75 degrees F on
the intertank.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate,
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 60
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 68 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F on the upper and 67
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 55 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 61 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A
frost spot appeared on a repair in the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange closeout near the -Y ET/SRB attach fitting. Three frost
spots had formed on the -Y bipod ramp to acreage bondlines. Two
cracks, 8-inches long by 3/8-inch wide and 4-inches long by
I/4-inch wide, were again present in the -Y vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS. These cracks exhibited no
offset and were not filled with ice or frost. This condition
was expected due to the elimination of the stress relief gap at
the factory.
Ice/frost had formed on the pressurization line ramp aft edges-
to-acreage bondlines at stations XT-1334, 1399, 1464, 1528, and
1593.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. Some ice/frost had accumulated on the
aft and inboard sides of the umbilical. Formation of ice/frost
on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents was
typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred
during tanking and stable replenish.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were covered
with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the top
and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier.
Ice/frost on the aft side was typical. Ice/frost fingers had
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents.
Ice/frost was present on the LH2 feedline support bracket near
the forward outboard pyro canister and on the aft pyrotechnic
canister closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. No
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking
and stable replenish.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of ii OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented an ice/frost formation at the interface
of the LH2 feedline and outboard support bracket.
Anomaly 002 documented an ice/frost formation with venting
vapor on the +Y side of the -Z manhole cover closeout. The ice
and frost had melted by T-3 hours.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formation on the -Y longeron
closeout approximately 2 inches forward of the ET/SRB cable
tray.
Anomaly 004 documented two cracks in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
forward surface BX-250 near the longeron closeout.
Anomaly 005 documented an ice/frost formation with venting
vapor on the +Y side of the +Z manhole cover closeout. The ice
and frost had melted by T-3 hours- '
Anomaly 006 documented ice/frost accumulations on the aft side
of the GH2/G02 pressurization line ramps at stations XT-1205,
1270, 1334, 1464, and 1722.
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Anomaly 007 documented 3 frost formations along the outboar_
and aft edge of the -Y bipod ramp to acreage interface.
Anomaly 008 documented a frost formation on the +Y longeron
closeout approximately 2 feet aft of the thrust strut knuckle-
to-longeron interface.
Anomaly 009 documented an ice/frost formation on a factory
repair located in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
(-Y+Z quadrant).
Anomaly 010 documented an ice/frost accumulation with venting
vapors on the +Y side of the LH2 recirculation line during
drain.
_omaly 011 documented a crack (knitline separation) on the
forward side of the +Y vertical strut electrical feed-through
box closeout. The crack, detected during the post drain walk
down, was located on the bevel +Z side of the closeout.
5-5 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds.
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of
the umbilical carrier plate.
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the
GOX vent hood was retracted.
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Ice and frost had formed on the pressurization line ramp aft
edges-to-acreage bondlines at stations XT-1334, 1399, 1464,
1528, and 1593.
Or_N_L PAGE
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Less than usua] amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/ORB
LH2 umbilical. Some ice/frost was present on the LH2 feedline
support bracket near the forward outboard pyro canister
bondline indicating a thermal short. No cryogenic drips or
unusual vapors appeared during tanking and stable replenish.
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5.6 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSFECTION
The launch of STS-51 was aborted at T-3 seconds due to a
problem with an SSME #2 fuel flow sensor. A post drain inspec-
tion of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39B from 1520 to 1615
hours on 12 August 1993.
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. There
were seven shallow scratches in the nosecone footprint area
topcoat. There appeared to be two scratches on the -Y side of
the nosecone possibly exposing the SLA.
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Some ice remained in the LO2 feedline support brackets, but no
loose foam or TPS cracks were visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
The 6-inch and 4-inch cracks in the -Y ET/SP_ vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS (observed during the two previ-
ous cryogenic loadings) were still visible but had not changed.
No obvious TPS damage was visible on the LH2 recirculation
line, the -Y thrust strut-to-longeron interface, or the -Y
bipod ramp closeout _ aft edge where small areas of ice/frost had
formed during drain.
The SSME abort, and resulting free burning hydrogen fire, as
well as the use of FIREX water caused no significant TPS damage
on the Orbiter. Numerous 1/4 - 1/2 inch diameter damage sites
were visible on the base heat shield tiles. Some of the AFRSI
blankets on the -Z side of the aft RCS stingers appeared to be
discolored. The ET/ORB LH2 and LO2 umbilical purge barrier
baggies were torn in several locations. A small piece of foil-
like insulation was loose on SSME #i.
No anomalies were observed on the Solid Rocket Boosters or MLP.
No significant vehicle damage was observed during the prelimi-
nary external post drain inspection. No IPR's were generated as
a result of this inspection.
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Post drain inspection revealed seven shallow scratches in the
nosecone footprint area topcoat. There appeared to be two
scratches on the -Y side of the nosecone possibly exposing the
SLA.
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5.7 ABORT FII/_/VIDE0 REVIEW
Eighteen videos, sixteen 16mm high speed films, and seven 35mm
large format films were reviewed on 20 August 1993.
There was no significant external damage to the vehicle as a
result of the SSME abort.
Only SSME #i had a run time long enough to form a Mach diamond
before receiving the shutdown command. Post shutdown appearance
of hydrogen and cold helium purge gas exiting the SSME nozzles
was similar to previous SSME aborts-
Free burning hydrogen drifted upward to the base heat shield
and OMS pods, burned the aft RCS thruster paper covers, and
appeared to dissipate quickly (E-76, 77, OTV 170, 171) . Insula-
tion and small amounts of surface contamination on the LH2 T-0
umbilical freon supply lines burned/flared briefly (E-18, 20,
63, 77, OTV 171) . Subsequent inspection of the freon supply
lines revealed only minor charring of the insulation.
FIREX water coverage of the SSME's and base heat shield area
was adeguate. Firex water to the OMS pods and Orbiter T-0
umbilicals was not activated since no fire or leak detectors
had been tripped. Firex water streams directed at the center of
the Orbiter vertical stabilizer did not appear to help the
safing process and may be changed. Firex water did not reach
the ET/OP_ LH2 umbilical and water coverage to the ET/ORB L02
umbilical was inconsistent. Firex systems engineers and Design
Engineering recommended increasing the available water pressure
by terminating the water flow on the FSS and MLP Side i, which
would not be needed for a main engine abort. A configuration
change is being evaluated to move some FIREX nozzles to the top
of the hydrogen dispersal system decreasing the distance from
the water source to the ET/ORB umbilicals by 15 feet.
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Only SSME, #] had a run time long enough to form a Mach diamond
before receiving the shutdown command. Post shutdown appearance
of hydrogen and cold helium purge gas exiting the SSME nozzles
was similar to previous SSME aborts. There was no significant
external damage to the vehicle as a result of the abort.
38 CR:C ''':'_ p'_::"
COLOR _-:i-4:)_-OGRAPH

Free buxning hydrogen drifted upward to the base heat shield
and OMS pods, burned the aft RCS thruster paper covers, and
appeared to dissipate quickly. Insulation and small amounts of
surface contamination on the LH2 T-0 umbilical freon supply
lines burned flared briefly. Subsequent inspection of the freon
supply lines revealed only minor charring of the insulation.
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6.0 LAUNCH
STS-51 was launched at
on 12 September 1993.
12:11:45:00.007 GMT (7:45 a.m. local)
6.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
A pre-launch SSV/pad debris inspection was performed from 0845
to i000 hours on Ii September 1993. No anomalies on the
facility or the flight hardware were detected. The only item
entered in OMI S0007, Appendix K, listed cleaning/vacuuming
deck scale and sand from the MLP deck zero level.
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 12 September 1993 from 0210 to 0340 hours during
the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRSr or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations- There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
72.9 Degrees F
].00. Percent
4.1 Knots
284 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 8 and 9.
6.2 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers, including the wet covers on the F3U,
F4R, L2L, L3L, R2U, and R3R nozzles, were intact. Typical ice
and frost accumulations were present at the SSME #I and #2 heat
shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Some condensate was present on the
SSME engine mounted heat shields and the base heat shield
tiles. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature
gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat
shields- No unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME
nozzles.
6.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
No SP_ anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. SP_ case
temperatures measured by the PSTI averaged 76-77 degrees F; the
spot radiometer ranged from 76 to 79 degrees F; and the SRB
Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEI) measured temperatures
from 77 to 81 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above
the 34 degrees F minimum requirement- The predicted Propellant
Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 81 degrees F,
which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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FIGURE 9. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
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The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0030 to 0745 hours and the results tabulated in Figure i0.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Ice Team observed no ice frost accumulations on the L02
tank though light condensate was present on the L02 tank ogive
and barrel sections. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble
valve cover was intact. The portable STI measured surface
temperatures that averaged 69 degrees F on the ogive and 65
degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, the Cyclops
radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 68 degrees F on
the ogive and 65 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE predicted
temperatures of 64 degrees F on the ogive and 58 degrees F on
the barrel.
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and LO2 tank-to-intertank
flanges. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual vapor,
was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate- The portable STI
measured an average surface temperature of 71 degrees F on the
intertank. The spot radiometer measured a surface temperature
of 72 degrees F.
Vapors (visible puffs of cold purge gas) simultaneously exited
the intertank +Z and -Z aero vents numerous times during the
walkdown at T-3 hours. The vapors were also observed just
before SSME ignition. This is a common and expected event.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Condensate, but
no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. The
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 59
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 65 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 60 degrees F on the upper and 64
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 53 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 64 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A
frost spot appeared on a repair in the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange closeout near the -Y ET/SRB attach fitting. Three frost
spots had formed on the -Y bipod ramp to acreage bondlines.
Ice/frost had formed on the pressurization line ramp aft edges-
to-acreage bondlines at stations XT-1851.60, 1787.00, 1334.80,
1205.60, and 1270.20. Three small frost spots had formed on the
-Y longeron closeout; 5 small frost spots had formed on the +Y
longeron closeout.
Two cracks, 9-inches long by 3/8-inch wide and 4-inches long by
i/4-inch wider were again present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
forward surface TPS. These cracks exhibited no offset and were
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not filled with ice or frost. The one crack, previously 6
inches in length, was now 9 inches in length. A three-inch
diameter ice/frost accumulation had formed on the +Y vertical
strut aft surface-to-acreage bondline
These conditions were acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303
criteria.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. Some accumulations of ice/frost were
present on the acreage areas of the umbilical along the purge
barrier. Formation of ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyro canister purge vents was typical. Normal venting of
nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable
replenish, and launch.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with
condensate and some frost was beginning to form.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was present on
the LH2 feedline-to-support bracket closeout bondline and on
both the aft and forward outboard pyrotechnic canister closeout
bondlines indicating thermal shorts. The 17-inch flapper valve
actuator access port foam plug was properly closed out. Some
ice/frost had formed around the cable tray vent hole. No
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking,
stable replenish, and launch.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was removed from the
vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of nine OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented an ice/frost formation with venting
vapor on the +Y side of the -Z manhole cover closeout. The ice
and frost had melted by T-2 hours.
Anomaly 002 documented an ice/frost formation at the interface
of the LH2 feedline and outboard support bracket.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formation on the -Y longeron
closeout approximately 2 inches forward of the ET/SRB cable
tray.
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Anomaly 004 documented two cracks in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
forward surface BX-250 near the longeron closeout.
Anomaly 005 documented ice/frost accumulations on the aft side
of the GH2/G02 pressurization line ramps at stations
XT-1851°60, 1787.00, 1334.80, 1270.20, and 1205.60.
Anomaly 006 documented an ice/frost formation with venting
vapor on the +Y side of the +Z manhole cover closeout. The ice
and frost had melted by T-2 hours.
Anomaly 007 documented a frost formation with venting on the +Y
longeron closeout approximately 3-4 feet aft of the forward
edge and 8-inches from the +Y edge. There were 4 other frost
spots on the longeron closeout TPS.
Anomaly 008 documented a 3-inch long by 1.5-inch wide ice/frost
formation with venting along the outboard and aft edges of the
-Y bipod ramp to acreage interface.
Anomaly 009 documented a 4-inch long by 1.5-inch wide ice/frost
area with venting aft of the +Y ET/SRB cable tray on the BX-250
closeout.
6.5 FACILXTM
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. An electrical outlet
cover was loose and dangling from a tether on the west side of
the LH2 TSM.
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds.
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of
the umbilical carrier plate. Liquid air dripped from the GH2
vent line on the FSS 115 foot level to the FSS 195 foot level
in front of the closeout crew tool locker. No hydrogen regis-
tered on a hand-held hydrogen meter. Post launch inspection of
the area revealed two saw cuts in the drip pan beneath the GH2
vent line elbow. The cuts will be tack welded closed.
The GOX seals were in nominal configuration. No ET nosecone/
footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent hood was
retracted. No icicles were present on the GOX vent ducts at the
time of launch.
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Pre-launch configuration of the bipods, jack pad closeoutsr
and intertank acreage TPS prior to cryoloading
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Ice/frost formed on the -Y (left) bipod spindle housing
closeout-to-ET interface bondline.
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o0
Ice/frost had formed on the pressurization line _amp aft
edges-to-acreage bondlines at stations XT-185] - 60, ] 787.00,
]334.80, 1205.60, and 1270.20.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the
L02 feedline bellows and support brackets
5O

%5 small ice/frost spots had formed on the +_[ ]ongeron c]oseout
5]

• /
Two cracks, 9-inches long by 3/8-inch wide and 4-inches long by
I/4-inch wide, were present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward
surface TPS. The cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled
with ice or frost-
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/ORB
LH2 umbilical. Some ice/frost was. present on the LH2 feedline
support bracket near the forward outboard pyro canister
bondline indicating a thermal short. No cryogenic drips or
unusual vapors appeared during tanking r stable replenish, and
launch.
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7.0 POST LAUI_CH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, and RSS was
conducted on 12 September 1993 from Launch + 1-1/2 to 3 hours.
The only flight hardware found was a small piece of Orbiter
FRSI plug material on the MLP deck.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP EPON shoe shim
material was intact. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts- All of the north
HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. The SRB
aft skirt purge lines were in place, but slightly damaged. The
SRB T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical damage with several
connectors protruding above the interface plane.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage. The GH2 vent line was
latched on the fourth tooth of the latching mechanism and had
no loose cables (static retract lanyard) . The GH2 vent line
appeared to have retracted nominally and showed typical signs
of SRB plume impingement. The ET intertank access structure
also sustained typical plume heating effects.
Typical damage to the facility included:
i . Film camera E-I (located on NE corner of MLP deck) housing
lens was shattered.
. The door to the phone box on the FSS 115 foot level had
been blown open but remained attached.
. A 7 foot by 4 inch by i/4-inch thick piece of sheet metal
was located on the elevator south side FSS 175 foot level.
An electrical box cover (TTC 20) was blown off and was
found on the north side of the elevator.
. A section of a "Caution" sign was found on the retracted
portion of the intertank access arm on the FSS 215' level.
o The 255 foot elevation sign was detached from the east
side of the level.
. A large light fixture 2 feet by 1.5 foot diameter was
found near the entrance to the PTCR on the pad apron.
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage.
Post launch inspections on 13 September 1993 included a
walkdown of the pad acreage, north flame trench and beach, and
a helicopter overflight of the pad/water areas. No flight
hardware or TPS material was found. Post launch pad inspection
anomalies are listed in Section 12.
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South SRB HDP erosion was typlcal. All south HDP EPON shim
material was intact. There were no stud hang-ups on any of the
holddown posts.
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#A. 7-foot by 4-inch by i/4-inch thick piece of sheet metal was
found on the elevator south side FSS 175 foot level
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8.0 FII_PO_V_AI_D PROB__ORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. No IFA candidates were proposed as a result of the
film review.
8.1 LAUNCH FILMANDVIDEO SUlf@tR_
A total of 105 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm
films, twenty-one 35mm films, four 70mm films, and thirty-nine
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
thet would have affected the mission.
vapors (visible puffs of cold purge gas) simultaneously exited
the intertank +Z and -Z aero vents prior to SSME ignition
(E-34) ° These vapors are routinely observed from the start of
cryo load through terminal countdown- The visibility of the
vapors is a function of ambient temperature, relative humidity,
dew point, local winds conditions, lighting conditions
(sunlight or Xenon light), and intertank gas temperature.
Prior to ignition, free burning hydrogen drifted under the body
flap. SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile
appeared normal (C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 163, 170, 171).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, 77).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals- There were no unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking,
stable replenish, ignition, liftoff, or tower clear (OTV 109,
150, 154, 163, 164)-
Three small pieces of tile surface coating material were lost
from base heat shield tiles outboard of SSME #3 during ignition
(E- 17) .
A small debris particle fell out of the LH OMS nozzle during
SSME ignition (E-20) .
Deflection of the External Tank nosecone during SSME ignition
was approximately 33 inches (E-79) .
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 163). GUCP disconnect and
retraction from the External Tank was nominal. The GH2 vent
line latched normally with no rebound (E-33, 34, OTV 160) .
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Several white objects appeared near the top of the GH2 vent
line elbow and are believed to be pieces of ice (E-41, 42, 48,
5O) .
A dark object falling from the LH wing RCC panels near the wing
tip was identified as a moth (OTV 163).
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. The
HDP #4 EPON sidewall shim material came loose during SRB lift
off and fell into the SRB exhaust hole (E-7) . The north
holddown post blast covers closed normally.
The protective lens in the E-I camera cover was shattered by
the SRB ignition shock wave.
Two cloth parts tags from the SRB sound suppression water
troughs were ejected upward out of the RH SRB exhaust hole
after T-0 (E-5) .
Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all
MLP rainbirds.
Pad debris, most likely pieces of SRB throat plug material, was
visible to the north over the SRB flame trench. Two light
colored objects believed to be birds near the camera, appeared
in the field of view during ascent (TV-4B) .
A flash occurred in the SSME #i plume as the vehicle cleared
the tower (E-40) .
Condensate/vapors trailed from the split in the rudder speed
brake. White flashes occurred in the SSME plume during the roll
maneuver (E-52, 57).
Pieces of RCS paper covers were visible passing over the
Orbiter wings (E-59, 212, 222) .
Movement of the body flap was very pronounced with frequencies
similar to previous flights (E-207, 212, 220r 222) .
Local flow condensation on the vehicle was typical (E-207,
220) .
Exhaust plume recirculation, SRB plume tailoff, and separation
appeared nominal (E-207, 208, 212, TV-4B) .
Frustum separation from the forward skirts appeared normal.
Main parachute deployment, reefing, inflation, and jettison at
splash down was nominal. Nozzle severance debris was typical
(E-301, 302).
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Vapors (visible puffs of cold purge gas) simultaneously exited
the intertank +Z and -Z aero vents prior to SSME ignition. The
vapors are routinely observed from the start of cryo] oa<|
through terminal countdown. The visibility of the vapo_.-s is
functioi_ of ambient weather conditions, lighting, and intertank
gas tempe_fature.
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The HDP #4 EPON sidewall shim material came loose during
SRB liftoff and fell into the SRB exhaust hole
6O

8.2 OI_-OI_BIT FILM AND VIDEO S_Y
ORBITER
Deployment of the ACTS/TOS payload and associated TOS Super*Zip
Anomaly (reference IPR 60V-0007 and Post Flight Anomaly
Investigation by S. J. Payne/TP-POD-2/19 October 1993) caused
debris induced damage to the LH OMS pod leading edge, base of
the vertical stabilizer, and payload bay areas aft of bay #Ii.
Video review of the satellite deployment revealed at least 16
pieces of debris, most likely detached frangible doublers from
the outer perimeter of the SupereZip separation system, exiting
the payload bay.
A review of on-orbit photographs from the crew handheld still
cameras showed 6 damage sites on the vertical stabilizer base
leading edge tiles. The LH OMS pod leading edge sustained a
total of 18 tile damage sites. Seven hits were greater than one
inch in length with depths ranging from 0.75 to 1.00 inches.
Post landing inspection of the payload bay revealed three
penetrations (3-1/2" x i/8", 3/4" x i/8", 1-3/4" x 1/8") in bay
#12 cable tray covers, one penetration (1/2" x 1/8") through
the aft bulkhead near APU #3, scrapes on the bay #12 sill
longeron, cuts/tears in thirteen TPS insulation blankets, and
silicone/ lead residues on fifteen aft bulkhead blankets. A
13-inch long segment of the frangible doubler was wedged
between the port sill and the aft bulkhead.
During the ACTS/TOS deployment, the primary and secondary
separation detonation cords in the airborne support equipment
Super_Zip device fired simultaneously. This caused the ordnance
containment tube to rupture and release debris into the orbiter
payload bay. Only the primary detonation cord should have
fired.
61

%tb_-orbJt camera view revealed at least 16 pieces of debris,
most I]kely detached frangible doublers from the o,lt e,
perimeter of the Super*Zip sepaxation system, exiting th_
payload bay after satellite deployment.
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[}ebris f.rom the S11pe_.*Zip anomaly caused 6 damage sites on the
verti<:m! stabJ ] ize£ leading edge tiles. The LH OMS pod leading
edge sustained a total of ]_ tile damage sites.
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EXTERNAL TIH_K
Thirty-seven handheld still images (DTO-0312) and video were
obtained of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter
by the flight crew. 0v-103 was not equipped to carry umbilical
cameras.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern.
One 8-inch divot was visible in the LH2 tank acreage just aft
of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the
bipods. Both +Y and -Y bipod ramps and jack pad closeouts
appeared to be intact.
One 8-inch divot occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout adjacent to the outboard side of the -Y bipod spindle
housing closeout.
Three 8-inch diameter divots were present on or near the -Z LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout-
A divot, 10-12 inches in diameter, was present in the -Y (LH)
longeron closeout.
Foam was missing from the +Y thrust strut flange closeout and
"new" foam was exposed.
The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies
were observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS
antennae, flight door, flight umbilical carrier plate, EB
fittings, bipod ramps, L02 feedline, aft hard point, and LH2
tank aft dome acreage. Typical ablation had occurred on the two
aft dome manhole cover closeouts. Frozen hydrogen was visible
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 17-inch flapper valve.
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r'l_ maj_t damage or lost flight ha]:dware was observed that wo_ll(1
h{_v_ been a safetv of flight concern. A rare, detailed view oI:
t]Je nose(:one showed charring, but no signs of TPS l(,ss . N,,
anoma].]es were visible on the tank acreage, RSS antenna, f]igh_
dour, fligh_ umbilical carrier plate, and EB fittings. The
] iqht band on the L02 tank ogive was an area sanded smooth
t,] _ or _o ]aunch.
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closeoul 3<I ia.cent tm t:he {}_itboa_<1 s_<l .... f the -Y bi_,<_(l ._:l'i'_'ll.'"
hoiJsimcT <:lo_out; one 8-in{:h divot wan present in th_ T,F{._ _ a[_l'.
acreage just aft of the flange closeout betw_-en the bip<_:]s; aI_,1
one divotr ]_0-12 inches in diameter, was visible in t I_ lef_
{ Y) ]<<,_u__.1_n closeout (ar1,,ws) .
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Three _li_r<tts a.te vJ,_i},l.e Jn the .LH; £ l.an_-to-lnl e__t ai_k f] an_qe
<.]_ose<)11t (arrows) _ The BSf'_ burr_ scaz on the LO;:: ta_k and all
dome charrinq are typical. Scorch marks running the length of
the ET from the EB fitting were caused by shock waves/air flow.
The_ we_-_ no TPS anomalies on the LH2 and. LO2 tank acreage.
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8.3 _I_IG FILM AND _-IDEO S_]_
A total of twenty-three landing items, including eight 35mm
large format films, four 16mm high speed films, and II videos,
were reviewed.
Due to the dark conditions of a night landing, most detail of
the approach, touchdown, and rollout were obtained from
infrared (3-5 and 8-12 micron) imagery.
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and
final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when
the landing gear was extended- Touchdown of the left and right
main gear was nominal and almost simultaneous-
The Xenon lights at the runway threshold provided good defini-
tion of the Orbiter wing tip vortices.
The drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before
the nose gear contacted the runway- Drag chute deployment
appeared nominal. The drag chute door appeared to get caught in
an aerodynamic vortex and made a harder-than-usual impact with
the runway. The mortar cover was propelled upward/aft when the
pyrotechnic charge fired and followed a trajectory to clear the
grass along the edge of the runway. The cover was not recovered
and most likely landed in a canal.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. The Orbiter
drifted slightly east of the runway centerline before being
corrected with nose wheel steering.
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) exhaust at the base of the vertical
stabilizer, left side, appeared to be 2 - 3 feet in height and
more noticeable than previous night landings. Infrared imagery
during approach/rollout, cockpit instrumentation, and telemetry
indicated the APU exhaust plume was typical and similar to APU
operation for launch. APU #3 exhaust plume on the right side of
the vertical stabilizer was present but barely visible.
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9-0 SRB POST FLIGHT/P,ETR_I133_LDEBRIS ASSESS_
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 14 September 1993 from
0830 to II00 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were
in good condition.
9.1 RR SOLXD ROCKET BOOSTER DEBR/S INSPECTXON
The RH frustum had 47 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint had occurred in localized areas
(Figure Ii) . All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in the
fully opened position.
The RH forward skirt acreage had two small MSA-2 divots as a
result of handling. There were no MSA-2 debonds. The -Z RSS
antenna cover/phenolic base plate was intact. The +Z RSS
antenna cover was damaged and the phenolic base plate was
missing. The substrate was not sooted and the damage most
likely was the result of nozzle severance debris impact. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems tunnel
cover and around the ET/SRB attach point (Figure 12). No pins
were missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward
separation bolt appeared to have separated cleanly.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension. Paint was missing from
several areas on the forward segment.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
The K5NA closeout material on the upper strut fairing was
intact. All three aft booster stiffener rings sustained damage
from water impact. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA
over the forward fasteners.
The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition.
However, a separation line was detected between the Booster
Trowellable Ablator (BTA) and the adjacent cork (Squawk 51-011,
PV-6-252520) . BTA was developed by USBI as a more economic
alternative to the K5NA closeout material and was applied for
the first time as closeout TPS to general acreage areas.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned correctly. The EPON shim
material was intact during liftoff and flight (Figure 13).
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The RH frustum had 47 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners, but n<>
missing TPS. All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked .in th_
fully o_ened position.
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iThe P/S F_orwar-d skirt acreage MSA-2 had no debonds. !l'w{, sm,-_l I
a__-eas <,f missing MSA-2 were the result of handling. Tl,e Y, l{._::
a.I_t:enna cover/phenoli<7 base plate was intact.
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The I Z RSS antenna cover was _4ama<]ed _md th_ ph_n_1 J ,. l,a._,_.
plate was missing- The substrate was not sooted and the' _t._maU,:"
mo._t ] Jkely was the r__sult of nozzle seve_n<'e deblis jmi,a,'t
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Faint was missing from several areas on the forward se,qme_H
/6
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Pi}st f] Jght (:(}mdition of the _ft 'booster/aft skirt. A sepa__a
I J_{;}n line was detected between the Booster Trowellable Ablato.,.
an<! the adjacent cork on the aft skirt. BTA, which is intende{l
to replace _<5NA closeouts, was applied for the first tim_ an
c.l.oseout TPS to genera] acreage areas-
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9.2 _ SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBR/S INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 41 MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners. Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint
had occurred in localized areas (Figure 14). The BSM aero heat
shield covers were locked in the fully opened position.
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward separation
bolt appeared to have separated cleanly.
The Fiel4 Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
conditior_- In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET,/_RD
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
The K5NA closeout material on the upper strut fairing was
intact. Two aft booster stiffener rings were damaged by water
impact. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact
and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. A
3-inch diameter piece of MSA-2 was missing from aft skirt
fasteners near the +Y side of the BSM's. Four MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners also occurred in this same general area. A
separation line was detected between the BTA and adjacent cork
(Squawk 51-010, PV-6-252523) .
Hypalon paint was extensively blistered and/or missing from
numerous areas of Booster Trowellable Ablator on the aft skirt
- IFA STS-51-B-2 (Figure 15). The Hypalon paint is used as a
topcoat to prevent moisture intrusion prior to launch, but is
not required for thermal protection during flight. The IFA was
closed based on the rationale that blistering and or loss of
Hypalon in flight will not cause significant Orbiter tile
damage due to the light mass/density of the topcoat. Practical
application history has shown that blistering and loss of
Hypalon occurs most frequently when multiple coats of the paint
were applied during preflight processing. A change to the
application procedure may specify only one, thin coat of
Hypalon.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. Approximately ten
percent of the EPON shim material .on HDP #7 aft skirt support
structure was missing prior to splashdown. The substrate was
sooted.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 12.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had a total of 41MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. The BSM aero heatshield covers were
locked in the fully opened position.
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The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were
intact.
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Post flight condition of the aft booster/aft skirt. A 3-inch
diameter divot and 4 debonds occurred over aft skirt fasteners
near the BSM' s- A separation line was detected between the BTA
and the adjacent cork.
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Hypa on paint was blistered and/or missing from numerous areas
of Booster Trowellable Ablator on the aft skirt. The Hypalon
paint is used as a topcoat to prevent moisture intrusion prior
to launch, but is not required for thermal protection during
flight. BTA, which is intended to replace K5NA closeouts, was
applied for the first time as closeout TPS to general acreage
areas.
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Blistering and loss of Hypalon paint occurs most frequently
when multiple coats of the paint are applied during pre-flight
processing. A change to the application procedure could specify
only oner thin coat of Hypalon.
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.%0.0 ORBITER FOST _II_G DEBRIS ._._SESS_0KI_.
A post landing debris inspection of or-103 (Discovery) was
conducted 22-23 September 1993 at the Kennedy Space Center on
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway 15 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to
identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 154 hits, of which 18 had
a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 41 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23,
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known
debris sources), indicates that the total number of hits was
slightly greater than average while the number of hits one inch
or larger was less than average (reference Figures 16-19).
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 100 hits, of
which 18 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice
and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources.
The following table breaks down the STS-51 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right OMS Pod
Left OMS Pod
HITS > I" TOTAL HITS
8 I00
1 22
I 2
0 4
1 8
7 18
TOTALS 18 154
The largest tile damage site on the lower surface (RH inboard
elevon) measured 3.75" x 0.50" x 0.25"
Twenty-nine hits just aft of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical may be
indicative of impacts from higher density materials, such as
ice.
No anomalies were noted on the RCC nosecap. LH RCC panel #9
coating had degraded- RH RCC panels #9 and #12 were streaked or
marked.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear inboard tires showed
tread wear from the landing on the KSC runway.
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STS-51
FIGORF16. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
1.0 x 0.25 x 0,25
1.125 x 0.25 x 0.125
1.5 x 1.25 x 0.125
8 Hits < 1"
• .25 x 0.25 x 0.25
.75 x 0.5 x 0.25
5 Hits < 1"
8 Hits _ 1"
16 Hits < I
Z
.J
D
8e
Protruding Gap
1.25 x 0.5 x 0.125
.0 x 0,25 x 0,125
11 Hits with one
1.0 x 1.5 x 0.125
g Gap Filler
TOTAL HITS = 100
HITS > 1 INCH = 8
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
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FIGURE 17.
STS-51
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
.0x 0.75 x 0.125
TOTAL HITS = 4
HITS > 1 INCH = 1
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STS-51
FIGORE18. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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ALL MF_ASUFIEMENTS IN INCHES
TOTAL HITS = 4
HITS > 1 INCH = 0
STS-51
fIGuRE19.DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
1.5 x 0.75 x 0.375
1.0 x 0.25 x 0.25
.0 x 2.0 x 0.625
13 Hits With
2.0 x 1.5 x 0.75
2.5 x 1.0 x 0.75
1.5 x 1.25 x 0.75
2.5 x 2.0 x 0.75
3.0 x 2.0 x 1.0
1.125 x 0.625 x 0.125
TOTAL HITS = 46
HITS > 1 INCH = 9
ALL DIMENBION9
IN INCHES
9O
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned
properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance reten-
tion shutters were closed properly. No debris was found on the
runway below the ET/ORB umbilical cavities. No red purge seal
or significant amounts of ET foam adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch line flapper valve.
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 were moderately hazed; windows #2 and
#5 exhibited light hazing. Streaks were present on windows #2,
#3 and #4. Surface wipes were taken from all windows for
laboratory analysis.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was less than average
though one tile between SSME #2 and #3 exhibited a large damage
site. One Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket MR
patch on SSME #2 9:00 o'clock position was torn frayed, but no
material was missing. The other DMHS blankets were in excellent
condition. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and
around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
The LH OMS pod leading edge sustained a total of 18 tile damage
sites. Seven hits were greater than an inch in length with
depths ranging from 0.75 to 1.00 inch. The damage was caused by
debris from the TOS SupereZip anomaly.
Due to the very prominent APU exhaust visible during the night
landing, an inspection of the area around the APU exhaust ports.
and at the base of the vertical stabilizer was made. There were
no anomaliesr such as TPS damage, loss of material, signs of
burning or melting, scorch marks, etc. The appearance of the
visible exhaust was considered to be a result of normal APU
operation.
Runway 15 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was
removed.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed
immediately after landing. All Orbiter drag chute hardware,
with the exception of the mortar cover, was recovered and
showed no signs of abnormal operation (tenth use of the Orbiter
drag chute in the Shuttle program). The cover was not found
during a more detailed daylight search. No organic (bird)
debris was found on the runway. Four Q-felt plugs, most likely
from the base heat shield area, were recovered in the vicinity
of the drag chute door (Figure 20).
The Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the
surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle (per OMRSD
V09AJ0.095) . Nine minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap
RCC was 206 degrees F. Forty-two minutes after landing, the RH
wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 108 degrees F and panel #17
was 107 degrees F (Figure 21) .
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FIGURE21. s'r_ 51 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER
RCC PANEL 17.]..(_ °
TIME 04:38 EDT
RCC PANEL 9 ]_:_o
TIME QZl.:38 EDT
ORBITER:
M ISSION:
0V-103
STS-51
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
NOSECAP 2nR °
TIME 84;05 EDT
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Im summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was
slightly above average while the number of hits one inch or
larger was less than average when compared to previous missions
(reference Figures 22 and 23).
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section
12.0.
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FIGURE 22. ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS4_ 15 80 36 120
STS_B 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS- 13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
STS- 17 (4 l-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
S TS-2 7 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51_1) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
S TS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS_I1 13 64 16 76
S TS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
STS-39 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS_43 24 122 25 131
STS_48 14 100 25 182
S TS44 6 74 9 101
STS*45 18 122 22 172
STS49 6 55 11 114
STS-50 28 141 45 184
STS46 11 186 22 236
STS_I7 3 48 11 108
S TS-52 6 152 16 290
STS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
STS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
AVERAGE 14.5 93.6 21.9 132. 7
SIGMA 7.3 45.3 10.8 60.4
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
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or-103 Discovery made the first night landing on KSC runway 15
September 22, 1993. The new drag chute configuration is
silhouetted in the Xenon lights. A very prominent, but normal,
APU exhaust is visible at the base of the vertical stabilizer.
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The largest tile damage site on the lower surface (RH inboard
elevon) measured 3.75 inches long, 0-5 inches wide, and 0.25
inches deep.
98
COtO_: i: ,-1J, ,,_.'_,,-'._H

Overall view of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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©No red purge seal or significant amounts of ET foam adhered to
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch line flapper
valve.
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Forward facing windows #3 and #4 were moderately hazed
Streaks were present on windows #2, #3r and #4
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Tile damage on the base heat shield was less than average. The
SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket MR
patches were intact and missing no material. Tiles on the
vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag chute door
were undamaged.
103
OF21_I?iAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH

%/
/
The left OMS pod leading edge sustained 18 tile damage sites.
Seven of the hits were greater than one inch in length with
depths ranging from 0.75 to 1.00 inch- The damage was caused by
debris from the payload deployment TOS Super_Zip anomaly.
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11.0 DEBRIS S_[PI.J_ _ P, EI:'ORTS
A total of sixteen samples were obtained from or-103 Discovery
during the STS-51 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy
Space Center. The window samples were inadvertently discarded
after sampling and no analysis was performed. The submitted
samples consisted of 2 lower surface tile residue scrape/wipes
from an area aft of the ET forward attach point and 6
scrape/wipe samples from the leading edge of the left OMS pod.
The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical
Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison
to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves the placing
and correlating of particles and residues with respect to
composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability.
Debris sample results analyses are listed by Orbiter location
in the following summaries.
ORBITER LO_R S_AC_ TILES
Samples from the Orbiter lower surface tiles indicated exposure
to Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS), paints, and primer
from various sources- There was no apparent vehicle damage
related to these residuals-
ORBITER LEFT OHS POD
Samples from the left OMS pod indicated exposure to Orbiter TPS
materials (tile, RTV, and silicon carbide) and metallics
(aluminum, zinc, and lead alloys). Trace amounts of ground-
type materials (salts, calcium and sulfur containing) and
paints were detected. The presence of the lead alloy could
have originated from the lead sheath in the pyrotechnic device
of the TOS "Super_Zip. ''
STS-57 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The final results of the STS-57 organic analysis are also shown
in this report (ref Figure 24). Types of identified materials
included those associated with window covers (plastic polymers,
RTV, paint). No new findings were associated with this analysis.
NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples led to one new
finding, which was obtained from the left OMS pod samples.
Although not conclusive, it appeared to be related to the
debris damage caused by the TOS SupereZip anomaly. Of the six
samples from the OMS pod damage sites, only one contained a
trace amount of lead material believed to be attributed to the
payload pyrotechnic device.
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12 . 0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, 9 post
launch anomalies, including 1 In-Flight Anomaly, were observed
on the STS-51 mission.
12.1 XJkUNCH PAD/SRPUTTLE LANDING FACILITX
i. Liquid air dripped from the GH2 vent line on the FSS 115
foot level to the FSS 195 foot level in front of the closeout
crew tool locker. No hydrogen registered on a hand-held
hydrogen meter. Post launch inspection of the area revealed two
saw cuts in the drip pan beneath the GH2 vent line elbow. The
cuts will be tack welded closed.
12.2 EXTERNAL TANK
I. One 8-inch divot was visible in the LH2 tank acreage just
aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the
bipods.
2. One 8-inch divot occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange closeout adjacent to the outboard side of the -Y bipod
spindle housing closeout.
3. A divot, 10-12 inches in diameter, was present in the -Y
(LH) longeron closeout.
12.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
I. Hypalon paint was extensively blistered and/or missing from
numerous areas of BTA on the LH aft skirt (IFA STS-51-B-2) .
2. A separation line was detected between the BTA and the
adjacent cork on the RH aft skirt (Squawk 51-011, PV-6-252520) .
3. A separation line was detected between the BTA and the
adjacent cork on the LH aft skirt (Squawk 51-010, PV-6-252523) .
4. The HDP #4 EPON sidewall shim material came loose during SRB
liftoff and fell into the SRB exhaust hole (film item E-7) .
12.4 ORB I TF2,
i. The LH OMS pod leading edge sustained a total of 18 tile
damage sites. Seven hits were greater than an inch in length
with depths ranging from 0.75 to 1.00 inches. The damage is
believed to have been caused by debris from the TOS Super-Zip
anomaly IPR 60V-0007.
Iii

Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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JSC-25994-51 LESC-30924
)
Space Shuttle
Photographic and Television
Analysis Project
STS-51
Final Report
October 27, 1993
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston. Texas 77058
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ENGINEERING AND SCIENCEPROGRAM
2400 NASA Road 1, P O Box 58561, Houston, Texas 77258 (713) 333-5411
October 27, 1993
Greg Katnik
MC/TV-MSD-22
OSB Room 5203R
KSC, Florida 32899
Dear Greg,
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-51 Final Report, and was completed
October 27, 1993. Publication numbers are LESC-30924 and JSC-25994-51. The actual
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey/483-5336
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
Sincerely,
Christine Dailey, Staff Scienti/st
Photo/TV Analysis Project
cc: Job order file
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1 Debris
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was observed to
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
Normal vapors and ice debris were noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 T-0 TSM
umbilical disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was
observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.1.1 Reflective Piece of Debris Below ET/Orbiter Umbilical Area
(Camera E-6)
Figure 2.1.1.1 An Orange Rectangular Shaped Reflective Piece of Debris was
seen Falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical Area at T-0.634
sec. MET.
An orange rectangular shaped reflective piece of debris was noted falling below the
ET/Orbiter umbilical area at T-0.634 seconds prior to liftoff. KSC reported that they
thought the reflective object was probably a thin piece of gold mylar tape used to attach
parts of the umbilical purge barrier material. The object was definitely not metallic
according to KSC.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1.1.2 SRB Flame Duct Debris
(Cameras E-2, E-5, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-IO, E-11, E-13, E-15, E-16,
E-26, and E-222)
2.1.1.2.1 Cloth-like Debris from SRB Flame Duct Area
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) flame duct area after SRB ignition. At 2.18 seconds MET, at least
four pieces of debris were seen north of the MLP. The origin of the four pieces of debris
was not determined but they were possibly from the SRB flame ducts.
Figure 2.1.1.2.1 Cloth-like Debris from SRB Flame Duct Area
Two white cloth-like debris objects approximately 2.5 inches wide were noted coming
from the RSRB area at liftoff (0.387 seconds MET). The objects were not seen to contact
the vehicle. KSC reported that the objects were two cloth parts tags from the SRB sound
suppression water troughs that were ejected upward out of the RSRB exhaust hole after
%0.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1.1.2.2 Dark Debris from LSRB Holddown Post M-7 Shoe Area
(Camera E-11)
A small dark piece of debris was seen coming from the LSRB holddown post M-7 shoe
area at liftoff (0.557 seconds MET). The debris object did not appear to strike the launch
vehicle. A rope like piece of debris was seen to the right of the LSRB at SRB ignition on
the same view.
2.1.1.2.3 Fast Moving Debris Near RSRB Holddown Post M.4(Task #7)
(Camera E-7)
A fast moving piece of debris was seen near the RSRB holddown post M-4 at 00.161
seconds MET. This debris did not appear to strike the launch vehicle. The 2D velocity
of this debris was found to be approximately 88 ft/sec, and the length of the debris was
approximately 1.8 inches. See Appendix D, Task 7 for more details.
2.1.2.3 Debris Near RSRB at Liftoff
(Camera E-25)
Numerous pieces of light colored debris fell along the RSRB at 0.581 seconds MET. The
debris did not appear to contact the launch vehicle. The origin of this debris could not be
determined.
2.1.2.4 Debris Forward of ET/Orbiter Umbilicals
(Cameras E-34 and E-79)
Two small pieces of debris seen forward of the ET/Orbiter umbilicals and aft of the
forward attach bipod fell between the orbiter and the ET at liftoff. The source of this
debris could not be determined.
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
(Cameras E-52, E-54, E-65, E-212, E-224, E-207, E-213 and E-
222)
2.1.3.1 Linear White Object at Tower Clear
(Camera E-54)
A linear white object was seen on the right side of the camera field of view as the orbiter
cleared the tower. The object did not appear to contact the vehicle.
2.1.3.2 Bright Objects Seen at 40 Seconds and 54 Seconds MET
(Camera E-222)
Two small bright objects were noted passing through the camera field of view at
approximately 40 seconds MET and 54 seconds MET. Neither object appeared to
originate from the vehicle and neither object was seen to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Debris Reported by Crew (Task #10)
No anomalies were reported by the crew in the ascent debris report. A transcript of the
ascent debris report is provided in Appendix D, Task #10.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.2 MLP Events
2.2.1 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-15, E-17, E-19, E-30, E-36, OTV-163, and OTV-I70)
Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen under the body flap prior to
SSME ignition. An orange vapor was also noted below the SSME bells and above the
SSME #3 rim prior to SSME ignition.
2.2.2 Vapors from ET Intertank Purge Vents
(Camera E-34 and E-63)
Figure 2.2.2 Vapors noted from ET Intertank Purge Vents
Vapor was noted coming from the external tank intertank +Z and -Z purge vents
(approximately 180 degrees apart) at T-2.799 to T-1.363 seconds prior to liftoff. Venting
from these purge vents has not been seen on previous mission launch films. This event
was reviewed with KSC, Martin Marietta, and the MER. No follow-up action has been
requested.
STS-51 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Si[ nificant Events
2.2.3 Discolored RCS (R3R) Paper Cover
(Camera E-19)
The R3R RCS port cover appeared discolored (prior to lifloff). Discolored RCS port
covers have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action has been requested.
2.3 Ascent Events
2.3.1 Orange Flashes in SSME #1 Exhaust Plume
(Camera E-2, E-19, E-40 and E-76)
Two orange flashes were noted in the SSME #1 exhaust plume at liftoff (0.765 and 0.873
seconds MET). Orange flashes in the SSME exhaust plume at liftoff have been seen on
previous missions. No follow-up action has been requested.
2.3.2 White Puffs in SSME Exhaust Plumes after Liftoff
(Camera E-52, E-57, E-218, KTV-5, KTV-7B, 0TV-141, and
0TV-148)
White puffs were seen after liftoff in the SSME exhaust plumes at approximately 11 to 13
seconds MET. White puffs in the SSME exhaust plumes prior to the roll maneuver have
been seen on previous mission films and videos. No follow-up action has been requested.
2.3.3 Flares in the SSME Exhaust Plumes After Liftoff
(Cameras E-52, E-204, E-212, E-218, and E-223)
Flares were seen in the SSME exhaust plumes after liftoff. A flare in the SSME #3
exhaust plume was seen at 12.93 seconds MET on camera E-52. Flares in the SSME
exhaust plumes after liftoff have been seen on previous mission films and videos. No
follow-up action has been requested.
Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
Body Flap Motion Seen on the Pad
(Cameras E-17,E-18)
Body flap motion was seen during the launch sequence. Analysis of this on-pad motion
indicated frequency peaks at 2.5, 7, 9 and 12 hertz for the starboard side; and 3.5, 7, 9,
11.5, 13, 20 and 23 hertz for the port side. Of all these peaks, only global rotation (9
hertz) could be correlated with an identifiable mode and this occurred on both sides of the
flap. The maximum peak-to-peak deflection on the starboard side was 0.9 inches on the
starboard side and 0.7 inches on the port side.
2.3.4.2 Body Flap Motion Seen during Ascent
(Cameras E-207, E-212)
During ascent, body flap motion was noted from approximately 24.4 to 48.8 seconds
MET. Films from the tracker cameras were reviewed for flap motion during ascent.
Camera E-207 provided the best view of this event during the period of maximum
dynamic pressure (-30-90 seconds MET). Due to camera defocus during the time of
maximum motion (frames 2520-2620 or about 40-45 seconds MET), analysis of the data
indicated that measurements lay within the noise.
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2.3.5 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E-212, ET-208, KTV-13)
A linear optical distortion along the SLV was noted at approximately 58 seconds MET on
the E-212 long range tracking view. Linear optical effects have been seen on previous
mission long range tracking views. No follow up action is planned.
2.3.6 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E-204, E-208, E-212, E-218, ET-204, ET-212 and
KTV-13)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-51 the start of
recirculation was observed at 93 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately
112 seconds MET on camera KTV- 13.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-51
CAMERA
KTV- 13
ET-204
ET-212
*E-204
E-208
E-212
E-218
START(seconds MET) STOP(secondsMET)
93 112
93 110
88 109
93 111
92 106
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
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2.4 On Orbit
2.4.1 Analysis of Onboard Photography of the ET from DTO-312
(Task #6)
Figure 2.4.1a ET Photographed after Separation Using 300 mm Lens with a
2x Extender on a Nikon Camera - Frame STS-51-22-019
STS-51 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.4.1b ET Photographed after Separation Using 300 mm Lens with a
2x Extender on a Nikon Camera - Frame STS-51-22-011
The following items were noted during the initial screening of the handheld photography
of the external tank. (All measurements of divots were made along the longest axis.)
A divot (arrow 1, figure 2.4.1 a), measuring approximately 13 inches, was observed on the
ET-Y longeron above the LH2 umbilical. Three divots were observed near the forward
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bipod : one to the left (-Y) of the left leg of the ET/Orbiter forward bipod on the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout, measuring approximately 15 inches (arrow 2, figure
2.4. la), one on the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between and just aft of the legs
of the forward bipod, measuring approximately 11.5 inches (arrow 3, figure 2.4. I a) and a
very small divot on or near the -Y leg of the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod jackpad. A
white mark on the face of the LH2 umbilical (probably frozen hydrogen) was also noted
(arrow 4, figure 2.4. l a).
Several small light colored areas (possibly TPS ablation) were observed on the edges of
the man hole covers on the aft dome (arrows 1 and 2, figure 2.4.1b). Other divot events
that were observed included: a divot on the LH2 tank-to-intertank closeout on the -Z axis
of the ET and a divot on the LH2 tank TPS (-Z) just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank
closeout (arrows 3 and 4, figure 2.4.1b) measuring 8.5 and 11.2 inches, a small divot on
the intcrtank acreage between the LO2 feedline and the right SRB forward attach point,
and a small divot on the LH2 tank TPS acreage near the aft right SRB attach point (arrow
5, figure 2.4. Ib).
Detailed notes for the handheld camera photographic screening of the external tank are
located in Appendix D, Task #6.
2.4.2 Analysis of aft ACTS/TOS Payload Cradle
Figure 2.4.2 Views Showing Aft Cradle Support Mechanism Left view is
from Payload Bay camera A; Right is from In-Cabin Video.
The down link videos covering the state of the aft cradle for the ACTS/TOS payload were
carefully screened. There appeared to be possible damage to the forward edge of the aft
cradle (arrow 2). The "super zipper" tube (arrow I ) was only attached to the cradle at the
detonation boxes located at the 12 o'clock position. A dual-camera Cartesian
phototheodolite technique was used to determine the distance of the super-zipper from the
aft cradle to the base of the cradle. The distance between these two points was estimated
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
to be 8.1 inches. An analysis of the motion induced in the super-zipper after an RCS burn
was performed. This analysis estimated the maximum induced motion to have a peak-to-
peak magnitude of 4.4 inches with a frequency of motion estimated at 0.30 hertz.
Views of the ACTS/TOS deploy sequence were studied in an attempt to find the source
of damage seen on the aft bulkhead. A review of the scene list from STS-51 indicated
that the actual deploy was seen from payload bay cameras D (starboard forward) and B
(port aft). However, while several pieces of debris were seen exiting the launch cradle
area, neither view revealed damage to the aft bulkhead. A sequence of frames from the
deploy sequence (taken at 5 second intervals from payload bay camera D) were saved to
disk. These images were then enhanced using techniques to increase the contrast in the
region of interest. However, the video quality (zoom factor and wide field-of-view)
hampered detailed analysis. Analysis was also performed on the post debris damage
assessment views: specifically, from the RMS wrist camera. Since this assessment was
mostly concerned with damage to the cradle area, only a brief view of the port side of the
aft bulkhead was shown (P). Enhancements of the area in question proved inconclusive.
Landing Events
Venting of the Left Auxiliary Power Unit Exhaust Port(s)
(Cameras EL-18 (IR), KTV-5L, KTV-6L, KTV-I IL, KTV-33L, SLF
North, SLF South, and UCS-7 (AR))
Figure 2.5.1 Venting noted from Left Auxiliary Power Unit Exhaust
Port(s).
The MER requested a comparison of the STS-51 left auxiliary power unit (APU) venting
which indicated that a fire may be present and the APU venting of previous landings.
Videos from seven landings were reviewed (STS-32, STS-35 @ night; STS-33 @ dawn
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and STS-31, STS-41, STS-55 and STS-57 during the day). Venting of the APUs was
seen on the infrared views for the landings which had infrared cameras (STS-32, 33, 35);
however, venting was not observed on any of the visible views except for STS-33.
During a close-up view of the STS-33 APU area, venting was seen due to the presence of
heat waves; however, no flames were observed. The review of these previous missions
indicated that the venting during the STS-51 landing was the most prominent and
persistent. The origin of the flame (exhaust port 1 or 2) could not be determined from the
given views due to the resolution of the video. Normal venting was observed from the
right APU exhaust port on the infrared views. Launch views of the left auxiliary power
unit vent area have been reviewed. No unusual events were seen in the vicinity of the left
APU exhaust port.
The MER requested that a composite video be prepared. The video contained views of
STS 51 landing, STS 35 also a night landing, STS 9 a day landing with a known fire
source, and approach and landing test (ALT) #1. Additionally, six composite films from
ALT #1 and #2 and 25 films of the manned/captive ALT #1 and #2 were screened. No
indication of a fire in the port APUs could be identified. However, none of these films
showed a view of the port APU area immediately following wheel stop.
2.5.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3)
(Camera EL- 7)
Camera EL-7 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data were gathered
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown using film EL-7 that had a
speed of 100.0 frames per second. Scalar information was determined by using the
distance between the main landing gear struts. An assumption was made that the line of
sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-axis. The y distance between the
main gear and the reference point was then multiplied by the scale to find the height of
the main gear. These heights were then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of
the regression line was equal to the sink rate. The main gear sink rate was determined to
be 0.84 feet per second over the period from touchdown to one second before touchdown.
For the last 0.5 seconds the sink rate was approximately 0.8 feet per second, for the last
0.25 seconds the sink rate was approximately 1.3 feet per second, and for the last 0.1
seconds before touchdown the sink rate was found to be approximately 3 feet per second.
Note that the sink rate for the last 0.1 seconds is based on only five data points and may
be greatly influenced by digitizing errors.
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Task #3 Appendix D.
No film camera views of the nose gear touchdown sequence were obtained that would
allow for the measurement of the nose wheel sink rate.
2.5.3 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
(Camera SLF-North, KTV-33L)
Camera SLF-North was used to determine the video sink rate of the main gear. Data was
gathered approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30
frames per second. The points digitized were left main gear, right main gear and a
reference point. For main gear sink rate, the scale was found using the distance between
the main landing gear struts. An assumption was made that the line of sight of the
camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-axis. The y distance between the average
position of the main gear and the reference was then multiplied by the scale to find the
height of the main gear. These heights were then regressed with respect to time. The
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slope of the regression line was equal to the main gear sink rate. The analysis showed
that the main gear sink rate was 0.89 feet per second.
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 15 seconds after main gear touchdown.
Camera TV-33 was used to determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Scalar information
was determined by a system of equations which took into account the orientation of the
camera relative to the orbiter. Data was gathered approximately 1 second prior to landing
through touchdown at a rate of 30 frames per second. The equations were solved for each
observation which took into account the change in perspective as well as increase in size.
The distance between the bottom of the nose gear and the main gear was computed and a
linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance versus time data to find
the actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 3.57 feet per second.
Graphs depicting the
2.5.4
above data can be seen in Task #3 Appendix D.
Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras EL-9, EL-17 (IR), EL-18 (IR), KTV-5L, KTV-6L, KTV-
11L, KTV-15L, KTV-33L, SLF North, and SLF South)
Video coverage of the drag chute deploy was obtained. The deployment of the drag chute
appeared as expected. All drag chute event times were obtained from camera KTV-33L.
Drag chute initiation was noted at 265:07:56:15.560 UTC. Pilot chute inflation was
noted at 265:07:56:16.494 UTC. Bag release was noted at 265:07:56:17.162 UTC. Drag
chute inflation in the reefed configuration was noted at 265:07:56:18.363 UTC. Drag
chute inflation in the disreefed configuration was noted at 265:07:56:21.433 UTC. Chute
release was noted at 265:07:56:42.320 UTC.
The landing of Discovery at the end of mission STS-51 marked the tenth deployment of
the Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected.
Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the
views from the film cameras EL-9. This analysis is used to support the improvement of
the aerodynamic math models currently in use. The maximum horizontal chute
deflection was approximately 5.22 degrees. Graphical representations of the results of
this analysis may be found in Appendix D, Task #9.
2.6 Other Normal Events
Other normal events observed include: ice buildup on the SSME vent nozzles; ice debris
falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnects at SSME ignition
through liftoff; ice debris falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM disconnects at SSME
ignition through liftoff; inboard and outboard elevon motion at SSME startup; slight
vapor from the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent on the ET and frost on the vent louvers,
flashes in the SSME plume prior to liftoff; slight motion of the body flap between SSME
ignition and liftoff; base heat shield erosion during SSME startup; ice and vapor from the
GUCP during SSME startup and GH2 vent arm retraction; a slight slack in the GH2 vent
line lanyard during latchback; debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff; vapor
from the drain on the aft edge of the rudder speed break at tower clear; multiple pieces of
debris (RCS paper and ice) prior to and after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing and vapor
from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff; charring of the ET aft dome during ascent;
debris in the SSME exhaust plume from liftoff through the early ascent; slight overshoot
on the roll maneuver; a rippling of the RSRB thermal curtain after the roll maneuver;
expansion waves; condensation around the SLV during ascent; linear optical distortion;
SRB plume brightening; dark puffs in the SRB plume during plume brightening; slag
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debris in the SRB exhaust plume during and after SRB separation. Normal events
related to the pad are FSS deluge water spray activation; and MLP water dump activation.
2.7 STS-51 Abort Analysis (Task #11)
The following events were noted during the screening of the August 12 abort film and
videos: Orange vapors (probably free burning hydrogen) were noted beneath the SSMEs
after the startup of the hydrogen ignitors. After the apparent shutdown of the SSMEs,
orange vapors were noted beneath the SSMEs, near the base heat shield, and extending
furward along the left OMS pod and forward of the vertical stabilizer. Orange flames
were seen along the LH2 T-0 umbilical disconnect tubing. The paper covering the aft
R('S ports wcrc obscrved to ignite in flames.
I
Figure 2.7 Flames along the LH2 T-0 Umbilical Disconnect Tubing
A detailed integrated timeline of the events noted during the abort film and video
screening along with representative pictures were prepared for the MER manager. A
detailed screening report and the integrated timeline is included in Appendix D, Task 11.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Space Shuttle Mission STS-51, the seventeenth flight of the
Orbiter Discovery was conducted September 12, 1993 at
approximately 6:45 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex
39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and
downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-51 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a
b.
C.
d.
e.
Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
Correct operation of the following:
i. Holddown post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbiiicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
There was one special test objective for this mission:
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-four of fifty-four requested
cameras as well as video from all twenty-four requested cameras.
The following table illustrates the camera data received at MSFC
for STS-51.
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-51
16mm 35mm Video
MLP 22 0 4
FSS 7 0 3
Perimeter 3 3 6
Tracking 0 16 ii
Onboard 2 1 1
Totals 34 20 25
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments
of the video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Photographic coverage of STS-51 was considered excellent;
however, cameras facing east were strongly backlit by the sun.
There was a loss of data on camera E-57 due to a film jam. Camera
E-8 provided invalid timing data.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly and
recorded data through water impact. The astronauts carried a
35mm hand-held camera to record film for evaluating the ET TPS
integrity after ET separation. Thirty-seven frames of data were
recorded. Approximately seven minutes of camcorder video of the
ET after separation was received and reviewed.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals;
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent,
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors and
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon
motions were noted during ascent.
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b. ET Intertank Aero Venting:
Figure 1 is a frame of film taken from camera E-34 showing
venting from the external tank. After correlating this view with
views of the same event on cameras E-62 and E-63 it was
determined that the most likely source of the venting was the ET
intertank aero vent. Review of previous launch films show this
type of venting occurs when atmospheric conditions are similar.
c. Debris Near RSRB Aft Skirt:
Figure 2 is a film frame from camera E-212 showing a dark
debris object that was observed near the RSRB aft skirt at time
31.6 seconds. The origin of the debris is unknown. This debris
was observed only from camera E-212.
d. Debris Exiting LSRB Plume:
Figure 3 is a film frame showing a debris object that was
observed exiting the LSRB plume from camera E-222. The object
appeared to exhibit a vapor trail as it exited the plume. This
debris does not exhibit the behavior typical of slag particles
that exit the plume. The debris was observed outside the plume
at 67 seconds MET.
e. ET TPS Evaluation:
Thirty-seven frames of 35mm film of the ET after separation
were received and reviewed. There were two divots on the LH2
tank/intertank scarf joint on the -Z axis. These divots are
shown in figure 4. A divot was observed on the LH2 aft attach
brace. There was a divot at the base of the forward bipod on the
-Y side of the bipod. Also there was a divot located between the
legs of the bipod. These divots are shown in figure 5.
V, ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-I, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
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POST
M-I
M-2
M-5
M-6
CAMERA POSITION
E-9
E-8
E-12
E-13
TIME (UTC)
255:11:45:00.017
invalid timing
255:11:45:00.016
255:11:45:00.015
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 32 inches. Figure 6 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. These data were derived from camera
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-56 was determined to be
255:11:47:04.73 UTC as recorded by camera E-207.
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Figure i.
Venting from ET Intertank Aero Vent
Figure 2.
Unknown Debris near RSRBAft Skirt at 31.6 sec MET
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Figure 3.
Debris Object Exiting LSRB Plume at 67 sec MET
Figure 4.
ET TPS Divots at LH2 Tank/Intertank Scarf Joint
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Figure 5.
ET TPS Divots at Attach Points
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Space Systems Division
Rockwell International Corporation
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
P.O. Box 7009
Downey, California 90241-7009
October 21, 1993
Rockwell
interna_onal
In Reply Refer to 93MA3662
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA)
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-51 (Scrub 1, Scrub 2,
Launch Abort) and STS-51 Mission
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document
(NSTS 08244).
The first launch attempt on July 17, 1993 of STS-51 flight was scrubbed
(5:55 a.m. PST/GMT 198:12:55:00) because the system B External Tank vent arm
system and SRB holddown post pyrotechnic initiator controller's (PIC's) were
armed without being commanded due to a switch card failure. No films were
received from this launch attempt.
The second attempt to launch STS-51 on July 24, 1993 was scrubbed at T-19
seconds (6:26:41 am PDT/GMT 205:13:26:41) due to the right SRB hydraulic power
unit (HPU) turbine speed dropping below the specification lower limit. No films
received from this launch attempt.
The third launch attempt of STS-51 on August 12, 1993 was aborted at T-3
seconds (6:12:32 a.m. PDT/GMT 224:13:12:32:545) due to SSME #2 fuel flow sensor
A2 failure.
As a result of the launch abort several films were selected and processed by KSC
to provide possible data in the evaluation of the STS-51 launch abort. Rockwell
received 15 films for the photographic evaluation effort on August 18, 1993.
Review of films E-19 and E-20 did not identify any visual anomalies or other
off-nominal occurrences on the external surfaces of the three SSME's. Orange
vapors (possibly free burning hydrogen) were noted beneath the SSME's after the
start-up of the hydrogen ignitors. After SSME shutdown, orange vapor was
noted beneath the SSME's drifting upward to the base heat shield, along the left
OMS pod, and the vertical stabilizer. Orange flames were seen along the LH2
T-O umbilical disconnect tubing and the paper covering the aft RCS ports were
seen to ignite in flames.
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Due to the excessive orange vapor noted, films from previous aborted launches
(STS-55, 51F, and 41D) were screened for comparison and some orange vapor
was noted on the film from the STS-55 aborted launch.
Orange vapors were also visible on films E-l, E-18, and E-77 and burning paper
from the RCS ports was visible on films E-17, E-18 and E-77.
Other normal events reported on previous missions and observed for this aborted
launch were ice debris from the ET/Orbiter umbilical, ice from LH2 TSM T-O
disconnect, white debris (probably ice ) from LO2 TSM u_mbihcal lines and RCS
paper debris, during SSME start-up.
The fourth launch attempt of the STS-51 mission was successful and occurred on
September 12, 1993.
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video)
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-51 launch conducted on
September 12, 1993, at approximately 4:45 a.m. PDT (GMT 255:11:45:00.006) from
the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on September 22, 1993 at
KSC at 00:56 a.m. PDT (GMT 265:07:56:06).
Rockwell received launch films from 84 cameras (60 cine, 24 video) and landing
films from 26 cameras (12 cine, 14 video) to support the STS-51 photographic
evaluation effort.
Overall, the films showed STS-51 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from
the ET/ORB umbihcals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. Vapor
was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring of the
ET aft dome, recirculation and brightening of the SRB plumes were normal.
Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation also appeared to be
normal.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge
water was activatedprior to SSME ignitionand the MLP rainbirds were
activated at approximately I second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as isnormal.
All blast deflectionshieldsclosed prior to directSRB exhaust plum
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET
GH 2 vent linecarrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound.
No anomalies were identifiedwith the ET/ORB LH 2 umbilical hydrogen
dispersal system hardware.
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STS-51 was the seventeenth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB
holddown support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is
designed to increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving
the holddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut
fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not
increasing the probability of a holddown bolt hang-up.
No major or significant events were observed or identified. Events noted by the
Rockwell film/video users during the review and analysis of the STS-51
photographic items are summarized in the following comments. These events
are not considered to be a constraint to next flight.
1. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen below the SSME's
and the body flap just prior to SSME ignition on cameras OTV-163,
OTV-170, E-17, E-19, E-30, and E-36. This vapor appears to be similar to the
vapor noted on previous missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action
is planned.
2. Vapors from the External Tank intertank purge vents was noted at SRB
ignition on cameras E-34 and E-63. The two vent openings, each with an
area of six square inches, are located at the forward end of the intertank for
venting during preflight environmental conditioning and for equalization
of internal/external pressures in flight. Although venting from the purge
vents has not been seen on previous mission launch films, this event was
reviewed by JSC with KSC, Martin Marietta, and the MER. This event is
not considered anomalous and no follow-on work is scheduled for this
issue.
3. On camera E-6, an orange rectangnlar shape reflective piece of debris was
noted falling below the ET/Orbiter umbilical area at liftoff. KSC stated that
the debris was probably a thin piece of gold mylar tape used to attach parts
of the umbilical purge barrier material. No follow-up action is planned.
4. On cameras E-8 and E-9, two white cloth-like pieces of debris approximately
2.5 inches wide were noted originating from the right SRB flame duct area
at li/_ff. This debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. KSC reported that
the objects were two cloth parts tags from the SRB sound suppression water
troughs that were ejected upward out of the right SRB flame trench. No
follow-up action is planned.
5. Two orange flashes were noted in the SSME #1 plume at liftoff on cameras
E-19 and E-40. Flashes in the SSME plume have been observed on previous
missions and are probably caused by small amounts of contaminants in the
main engine. No follow-up action is planned.
6. White flashes were noted in the SSME plume during the roll maneuver on
cameras E-52, E-57, and E-212. White flashes or puffs in the SSME plumes
have been seen on previous mission films and videos. No follow-up action is
planned.
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7. During the film review at KSC (cameras E-207, E-212, E-220 and E-222) it
was reported that body flap motion was very pronounced with frequencies
similar to previous flights. Review of the films by JSC and Rockwell
corroborated the KSC observation.
Analysis is being conducted by JSC to measure the amount of deflection of
the trailing edge of the body flap. Analysis results will be documented in
the JSC report. No additional action(s) are currently planned.
.
The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed
on STS-51. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for
information only:
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area.
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas
and MLP.
• Charring of the ET aft dome.
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff.
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS.
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV
prior to SRB separation.
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up.
* Twang motion.
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q)
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar
to those of previous missions.
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent.
• Slag in SRB plume after separation.
• Condensation around the SLV during ascent.
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff.
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up.
.
Camera E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling
ET umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The
films showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no
anomalies were observed for the SRB body trajectory.
10. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement
No. DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff
to verify nozzle to holddown post drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
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11. The landing of STS-51 occurred on runway 15 at the KSC Shuttle Landing
Facility. During the f'mal approach and through wheel stop, excessive
venting of the left Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) exhaust port I or 2 was
observed on cameras EL-17 (IR), EL-18 (IR), KTV-5, KTV-6, KTV-11 and
KTV-33. Review of the videos to identify the origin of the venting (port 1 or
port 2) could not be determined. Videos from previous night landings
(STS-32, STS-35), dawn landing (STS-33), and day landing (STS-57) were
reviewed to compare the STS-51 left APU venting with venting seen on those
landings. Venting from the APU exhaust ports were only seen in the
infrared views of the previous landings and the STS-51 venting was more
predominant. No follow-up action is planned.
Good video and film coverage of the drag chute deploy was obtained and no
anomalous events were observed. The flight marked the tenth use of the
Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All
sequenced events occurred as expected and no hardware anomalies were
observed.
This letter is of particular interest to Messers W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and
C. F. Martin (MK-SIO-2) at NASA/JSC and NASA/KSC respectively.
The Integration Contractor contact is R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679.
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
Space Systems Division
A. _olfelt
ef Engineer
System Integration
RR/cl
CC: G. Della Longa, BC4, NASA/JSC, Houston, Tx
W. J. Gaylor, VF2, NASA/JSC, Houston, Tx
H. S. Brown, MK-SIO-2, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, F1
D. Pitts, SN15, NASA/JSC, Houston, Tx
G. Katnik, TV-MSD-22, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, F1
B. Hoover, BICO-1, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, F1
T. Rieckhoff, EP55, NASA/MSFC, Huntsville, A1
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